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1 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security  
FROM :   
External Activities Branch  
SUBJECT : Manuscript by David Phillips

1. Attached herewith is a proposed letter to Mr. David A. Phillips outlining deletions which the Agency would like made from his book. The general tone of the responses from Agency components was that, if possible, this book should not be published. In the view of most, it dangerously reveals sources and methods, internal organization, missions, and functions. It also provides public confirmation of covert Agency activities and the disruption and reduced morale created by Agee and others.

2. However, on the assumption that publication could not or would not be blocked, the operating components catalogued their most serious concerns. The attached letter to Mr. Phillips includes many of these reservations. The chapter by chapter review, which appears later in this memorandum, contains those recommendations for deletion which, for various explained reasons, should not be forwarded to Mr. Phillips.

3. Before proceeding with the manuscript review, we would like to advise that Mr. John Greaney of OGC has volunteered his services to accompany you or Mr. Stembridge when our proposals are placed before Mr. Phillips. Due to time limitations, he has not had a chance to review this memorandum or the proposed letter to Mr. Phillips as of this date.

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4. The following is a compilation of items of concern to Agency components which were not included in the letter to Mr. Phillips. This does not include chapters one and six which have been previously reviewed and returned to Mr. Phillips.

5. Chapter two: Guatemala

a. Several offices expressed concern that this book, for the first time, confirms the CIA's role with Col. Armas and the coup. However, since it would be difficult to defend a classification on this, it was not included in the letter to Mr. Phillips. The same was true of the reference to the coup in Iran (p. 43).

b. Another area of concern was our relationship with the FBI in connection with his arrest and our use of false identity papers in the U. S. Of particular concern was mention of a capability to alter FBI criminal records. Again, we don't believe we can prove classification.

c. The one item which could have been deleted was a footnote on page 35 which inferred that the CIA had indemnified Lloyd's of London for a sunken ship. LA Division was able only to ascertain that no payment had been made as of August 1960. Since the footnote begins "press reports claimed that . . ." without further specifying the source, we felt it best to make no comment to Mr. Phillips on this point.

6. Chapter three: Havana and Beirut

a. Some concern was expressed regarding the paragraph on page 13 explaining salary off-set for deep cover officers. Although this may be truly classified, it might be best to let it remain as is, to dissuade readers that the Agency or its officers are making extra money on the side.

b. Other comments related to the details of Mr. Wisner's death (p. 5); connecting Ernest Hemmingway with the Havana COS (p. 21); and confirming that an

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American executed by the Cubans was a CIA NOC (p. 48). The latter point, while clearly sensitive, was not raised to Mr. Phillips as LA Division posed no specific objection.

7. Chapter four: Bay of Pigs

a. Some objection was raised to Mr. Phillips citing the Gulf Steamship Company as a cover for the broadcasting aspect of the Bay of Pigs operation. However, in checking this out, it was learned that the cover was the Gibraltar Steamship Company so no objection is made to the use of Gulf.

b. SSU also raised questions regarding the confirmation of assassination planning against Castro (p. 12) and the use of the Alban Towers Hotel as a temporary lodging facility for Agency personnel (p. 17). Since no one else raised an objection on these points, they were not relayed to Mr. Phillips.

8. Chapter five: Mexico City

a. In addition to all the comments directed to Mr. Phillips (see attached letter), the SSU objected to discussion of the purchase of scotch (p. 15), the specifics associated with the Cuban missile crisis (pp. 25-27), and the handling of "walk-ins" (pp. 33-35). LA Division also objected to the Agency's role in name tracing (p. 8).

b. In view of the considerable deletions requested of Mr. Phillips, the above were not included as their sensitivity and justification for classification appears to be marginal.

9. Chapter seven: Washington, D. C.

a. Several offices took exception to some items in this chapter which were not passed on to Mr. Phillips.

b. The SSU objected to the mention of liquor in the Director's dining room and the footnote confirming

a CIA role in the Glomar Explorer (p. 26). In view of the fact that GSA is now trying to rent or sell the ship, we don't feel we can justify a classification on these items.

c. The DDO objected to the general discussion of cover starting on page 29, but we could not pin the objection down to specifics. SSU commented that Mr. Phillips reveals the location of many stations around the world (including [redacted] on page 31), but deletions of the names would be difficult to justify legally.  
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d. Both the SSU and LA Division objected to Mr. Phillips mention of assassination attempts on Castro (pp. 42-44), but, again, we would have trouble defending the classification of the information presented.

#### 10. Chapter eight: Rio de Janeiro and Caracas

a. The most sensitive objections to this chapter involved the information on pages 15 to 20 of our role in Chile - Track II. These included the allegation of back-channel correspondence and the fact that the information could distort the public's view of the whole affair. Unfortunately, no one could tie it to the sources and methods or classification questions and therefore it was not included in the Phillips letter.

b. Other items of concern were the discussion of cover in Brazil (pp. 2-3); the operational use of women (p. 23); the employment of blacks (p. 26), especially the revelation that two black officers in Brazil were CIA officers, jeopardizing their cover, and that Army commo went through the Agency during the Dominican crisis (p. 31). While all of these could cast us in a questionable light or make operational life more difficult, it would be difficult to justify their deletion on legal grounds.

#### 11. Chapter nine: LA Division

a. Although the requested deletions from this chapter are rather lengthy, they do not include all reservations raised by our offices.

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b. Several offices objected to references to the assassination of President Kennedy and the Watergate affair (pp. 5, 16, 30). These were rather innocuous and could probably not be justified on legal grounds.

c. The second objection was the author's general verification of the information in the Agee book and the impact of this book on the Agency. Again, deletion would be difficult to justify, but you may wish to discuss the damage potential with Mr. Phillips directly.

## 12. Chapter ten: Retirement

The DDO raised the question that Mr. Phillips statement on page 12 that he knew Agee has been to Cuba five times betrays knowledge he gained either from travel programs or liaison services. This would be a difficult point to argue in any confrontation with Mr. Phillips.

## 13. Epilogue

a. The SSU questioned whether this manuscript is the proper vehicle to surface the fact that two cables sent to Santiago in May 1973 established our non-involvement in the overthrow of Allende (p. 6). We could see no justification to strike this.

b. The SSU further believes that revelation of friction between Mr. Colby and Dr. Kissinger (p. 13) is also improper. Perhaps so, but difficult for us to press for deletion.

c. And last, the SSU objected to comments on pp. 14-18 which are suggestive of Agency judgements and evaluation regarding the conduct and success of the investigative efforts as well as other personalities critical of the Agency.



Att

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